Over the past decade, and especially over the past few years, political corruption, fraud and violence in the Philippines have reached such alarming levels that many Filipinos have grown despondent, even cynical, about their country's political system. Exploring the applicability or suitability of the concepts of 'predatory state' and 'patrimonial oligarchic state' to the Philippines, I find that the regime rather than the state is the more appropriate unit of analysis. I argue that the predatory regime, controlled by a rapacious elite, that held sway during the years of the dictator Marcos, has made a comeback in the Philippines. Under the governments of President Joseph Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, traditional clientelism has given way to pervasive corruption, a systematic plunder of government resources and the rapid corrosion of public institutions into tools for predation. Instead of just being a throwback to the 'old corruption' of the Marcos era, however, the current predatory regime represents a 'new corruption' adapted to the ways of economic and political liberalization. While not as authoritarian as Marcos' regime, it has growing authoritarian tendencies: centralization of power in the executive; heightened repression; rigged elections; a much weakened rule of law; numerous political appointees in the bureaucracy; and increased influence of the military. A shift to naked authoritarianism, however, cannot be ruled out. As forces for democratic reform are much too weak, the predatory regime may be around for some time or it could give way, at best, to a more traditional clientelist electoral regime. Prospects for democratic consolidation in the Philippines in the near future appear bleak.
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The Philippines: Predatory Regime,
Growing Authoritarian Features

By Nathan Gilbert Quimpo
Asserting that the world has fallen into a 'democratic recession', Larry Diamond (2008a: 36, 42) warns that 'predatory states' are on the rise and that they pose a threat to both new and established democracies. He describes predatory states as follows:
In [predatory] states, the behavior of elites is cynical and opportunistic. If there are competitive elections, they become a bloody zero-sum struggle in which everything is at stake and no one can afford to lose. Ordinary people are not truly citizens but clients of powerful local bosses, who are themselves the clients of still more powerful patrons. Stark inequalities in power and status create vertical chains of dependency, secured by patronage, coercion, and demagogic electoral appeals to ethnic pride and prejudice. Public policies and programs do not really matter, since rulers have few intentions of delivering on them anyway. Officials feed on the state, and the powerful prey on the weak. The purpose of government is not to generate public goods, such as roads, schools, clinics, and sewer systems. Instead, it is to produce private goods for officials, their families, and their cronies.
Most if not all of the features of predatory states that Diamond has described would seem to apply to the Philippines, a country characterized by grave social disparities and the 'These families,' he says, 'have perpetuated their stranglehold on our country's wealth, dynasty after dynasty. There is no end to their greed, no border to their covetousness.' Over the past decade, and especially over the past few years, political corruption, fraud and violence have reached such alarming levels that many Filipinos have grown despondent, even cynical, about their country's political system. Surveys conducted by the Asian Barometer (Diamond 2008: 40) and by TNS/Gallup International (2007) show low and/or declining numbers of Filipinos expressing satisfaction with democracy and viewing democracy as the best form of government.
In the latter study, the Philippines scored the lowest among ten countries surveyed in Asia.
Grappling with Diamond's concept of a predatory state, I make a bit of an adjustment in applying it to the Philippines: predatory regime, not predatory state. The Philippines is now back to having a predatory regime controlled by a rapacious elite, as it had during the Marcos dictatorship. This regime, although not an authoritarian one as in Marcos' time, has growing authoritarian tendencies. As forces for democratic reform are much too weak, the predatory regime may be around for some time or it could give way, at best, to a more traditional clientelist electoral regime. A turn towards out-and-out authoritarianism 1 , however, cannot be ruled out.
Whichever way, the Philippines seems bound to keep lurching from crisis to crisis in the coming years.
Predatory and Patrimonial States, Clientelist and Predatory Regimes
Before I proceed to discuss the notion of predatory regime, let me review briefly the literature on predatory state and the related concept of patrimonial state. Conceptualizing the predatory state well ahead of Diamond, Peter Evans (1995: 45) There is a bit of a problem, however, in Diamond's -and for that matter, Hutchcroft'schoice of unit or level of analysis: the state. It would be much too facile to label a certain state as predatory simply on the basis that for a certain period (say a few years), the behavior of elites has turned cynical and opportunistic. Since the state 2 is an entity that is somewhat enduring and resistant to change, the appellation predatory or patrimonial should not be loosely applied to states that have only begun to experience the politics of predation. The difficulty with using the 4 state as the unit of analysis is illustrated in Diamond's flip-flopping characterization of Indonesia.
In 2001, he dismissed Indonesia as having 'sunk deeply into a predatory state' (Diamond 2001: 6) ; now he says "democracy is finally gaining ground' there (Diamond 2008b: 213 Rather than witnessing a trend from the bad days of the 'old corruption' of economic dirigisme and political authoritarianism to a new dawn of economic competition and political accountability, we discovered the rise of a 'new corruption', rooted in the logic of economic and political liberalization, reflecting the activity of rapacious local elites no longer subject to the domestic and international constraints of the Cold War era and increasingly pervaded by criminal or 'mafioso' forces.
Historical Roots
For a deeper understanding of the Philippines' politics of clientelism and predation, one needs to trace the historical development of Filipino ruling elite all the way back to the colonial era. The Spanish colonizers turned the precolonial datus (chiefs) and maharlikas (nobles), together with Spanish and Chinese mestizos, into the privileged local class, the principalía, who were allowed to accumulate land and wealth (Simbulan 2005: chap. 2). The Spaniards later introduced municipal elections, in which only the members of the elite could vote and run for office. Although the municipal posts had limited powers, factions of the principalia competed for them intensely, even resorting to such means as bribery, intimidation and corporal punishment (May 1989) .
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According to Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora (2003) , the shorter American colonial period had a much more profound and enduring influence on the modern Philippine polity. Early on, the American colonial authorities embarked on a project of political tutelage, professedly to teach Filipinos the virtues of democracy and prepare them for self-rule. The American colonials quickly moved up elections from the municipal to the provincial and national levels, providing more and more opportunities to Filipinos to enjoy political power. The expanding opportunities, however, were limited to members of the elite. Because of requirements on property (dropped only in 1935) and literacy for voting, the vast majority of the Filipino masses were effectively excluded from the political process. Landlord oppression, together with the peasants' political exclusion, led to much agrarian unrest in the 1930s. Elections during the American period came to be dominated by the Nacionalista Party, a patronage-oriented, non-ideological party of the elite that successfully combined access to national power and resources with a provincial clientele.
Unlike other colonial powers, the US did not put much attention to building a modern into the patrimonialistic or predatory party. The KBL attracted many ambitious, self-serving politicians, helped get them into power, and provided the network and connections for the systematic exploitation of state resources (Quimpo 2007: 281) . Marcos brought into fruition the potential of the strong presidency dating back to the Quezon era -authoritarian centralization of political patronage -and gave it a predatory twist.
Rapid Democratic Regression in the Post-Marcos Period
With the toppling of the Marcos dictatorship through a peaceful popular uprising in February 1986, democracy was restored in the Philippines. There were, however, tremendous obstacles to the consolidation of the country's democracy. In a list drawn up by Samuel Huntington (1991: 253-4) of 'third-wave democracies' with 'severe contextual problems', the Philippines, along with Peru, came out on top, with five such problems. The Philippines was saddled with: major insurgency, extreme poverty, severe socioeconomic inequality, substantial external debt, and extensive state involvement in the economy. (If the list were to be updated now, ethnic conflict and terrorism would raise the country's major ills to seven.) As can be gleaned from the studies made by various scholars (elaborated in the next few paragraphs), grave inequalities in wealth and power constitute the country's most serious problem.
Despite all the hype about 'people power', the 1986 uprising did not make much of a dent on elite hegemony over Philippine politics. The congressional and local elections of 1987-8 saw the comeback of many politicians and political clans of the pre-authoritarian era -'the return of the oligarchs' (Gutierrez et al. 1992: 160) . And it seemed that nothing much in their behavior had changed since the clientelist politics of the 1960s. Some scholars writing about the initial postauthoritarian years, in fact, characterized the Philippines' newly restored democracy as merely being a return to 'cacique democracy' (Anderson 1988) , 'elite democracy' (Bello and Gershman 1990) or 'clientelist electoral regime' (Franco 2001 ) of the pre-martial law period.
Since then, however, a good number of political scientists have described Philippine 
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The Supreme Court later upheld the constitutionality of Arroyo's proclamation, but ruled that raids and arrests made during the emergency were illegal. In March 2007, Arroyo signed an antiterrorism bill, the 'Human Security Act', into law, purportedly designed to bolster the government's efforts against the Abu Sayyaf. Human rights groups have charged, however, that the law poses a grave threat to civil liberties and human rights.
The Return of the Predatory Regime
For those who examine predatory politics only through the prism of the state as the unit of analysis, it would seem that the governments or regimes of a predatory or patrimonial state just come and go, differing in style but not content, while the predatory or patrimonial state remains basically unchanged. Hutchcroft (2008: 144) notes, for instance, the differences in 'leadership styles' of the Philippines' post-authoritarian presidents:
The four post-Marcos presidents vary enormously in the quality and goals of their leadership. Corazon Aquino (r. 1986-92) , widow of a martyred politician, might be characterized as an elite restorationist, since her major achievement was to rebuild the elite-dominated democratic structures undermined by her authoritarian predecessor. Philippine politics cannot be explained away simply in terms of an enduring patrimonial or predatory state and mere differing styles of its rulers. A crucial distinction has to be made between the 'old-style patronage politics' of the Aquino-Ramos era and the descent into the brazen predatory politics of the Estrada-Arroyo period.
The predatory regime has made a comeback in present-day Philippines. The current predatory regime, covering both the Estrada and Arroyo governments, retains many of the characteristics of the pre-authoritarian era and of the Aquino-Ramos period. As before, rich and powerful families maintain vast networks of dependency by means of traditional patron-client ties, less personalistic forms of patronage and other means including violence. Under the present dispensation, however, the oligarchic elite has become much more cynical and opportunistic, preying on state resources with impunity. There is much greater resort to fraud, coercion and violence. The current regime is itself much more caught up in, and consumed by, the predatory dynamics that Diamond has described. Corruption has become the regime's core phenomenon, reaching a level rivaling that of the Marcos era.
The re-emergence of the predatory regime in the Philippines, however, should not be viewed simply as a throwback to the plundering years of the Marcos era. The current predation falls under the rubric of the 'new corruption' marked by the adjustment of predatory forces to global economic and political liberalization. All the corrupt or shady transactions were made within the context of an emerging market economy registering high levels of growth. The Philippines, moreover, has long been reputed to be among the most pliant in Asia to the neoliberal prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. The current regime is not authoritarian as the Marcos regime was, although it clearly has growing authoritarian features: centralization of power in the executive; heightened repression; rigged elections; a much weakened rule of law; numerous political appointees in the bureaucracy; and increased influence of the military. Like
Quezon over seventy years ago, Arroyo has succeeded in centralizing political patronage in the hands of a strong executive without having to resort to out-and-out authoritarianism (except for a week).
The current predatory regime has subverted many of the country's democratic institutions.
David (2008) Manipulated by the rapacious elite, the predatory regime has, in fact, warped democratic institutions or turned clientelistic institutions into outrightly predatory ones. The patrimonialistic or predatory political parties of the elite, essentially no different from Marcos' KBL, are a key institution of the current predatory regime. Ideologically indistinguishable from one another, they 19 are nebulous entities that can be established, merged, split, renamed, or dissolved any time.
Politicians change parties at the drop of a hat.
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Given the seemingly unceasing scams and cover-ups under the current predatory dispensation, the Philippines is assured of continuing political instability in the coming years. It is impossible to predict what exactly is going to happen. Another 'people power' uprising, a military mutiny (or coup) or a combination of the two could still topple Arroyo. In another crisis, she could resort to another state of emergency, possibly a much longer one, to martial law or even to a Fujimori-style autogolpe (self-coup). And she could then attempt to extend her stay in power.
With the 2010 presidential elections fast approaching, however, it is becoming more likely that Arroyo will finish out her term as the country's 'constitutionally elected' (sic) president. At this late stage, it does not look as if Arroyo will still be able -or care -to engineer a constitutional change that would allow her to hold on to power beyond 2010. If Arroyo does go in 2010, she will not do so quietly. She would have to marshal all possible resources and means to insure that her successor is a close ally, and not one who could put her behind bars, as she did to her
The fluidity of the parties may seem to be a sign of weakness, but this actually suits their predatory purpose to a T. It allows them to escape scrutiny and accountability and allows the predatory types of politicians to get away with almost anything (Quimpo 2007 The growing authoritarian features of the Arroyo administration will not necessarily culminate in an authoritarian predatory regime. In the coming years, it is likely that one of two possibilities will take place: 1) that the current predatory regime continues even beyond Arroyo's term; or 2) that the country reverts to a clientelist regime that is less corrupt and with less authoritarian features. The 2010 elections could very well produce another Arroyo-type president or another Ramos-type. It is unlikely that the Philippines in the near future will significantly move away from predatory or clientelist politics and take a more democratic turn. Predatory and clientelist elements are much too strong and the forces for democratic reform are much too weak. Habito (2008) predicts that the Philippines will again have a 6-7 per cent GDP growth in 2008. He warns, however, that the economy could be challenged by 'strong headwinds' -the US recession and the impending global economic slowdown; the government's poor record in tax collection; and 'the persistent excess baggage of graft and corruption, bad governance, and the consequent social and political unrest that this has been fueling'.
In a country very much dominated by a rapacious elite such as the Philippines, it will be difficult for the scourge of political corruption to be expunged quickly. Harriss-White and White (1996: 4) examine the prospects for the 'new corruption' in the developing world: 'In the long run, since competitive markets will destroy the basis of rent-seeking and democratic institutions will create the political constraints necessary to enforce accountability, corruption will wither away.
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Historically speaking, however, this took a very long time in the currently industrialized countries ...'
The prospects for democratic consolidation in the Philippines in the coming years appear gloomy. It may take at least half a decade for forces of change to turn the tide in democracy's favor. The challenge ahead of them is not only to strengthen 'weak' democratic institutions. Since many of the country's democratic institutions have already been warped or subverted, the challenge is perhaps much more to dismantle predatory and clientelist institutions and build democratic ones, or to transform the former into the latter.
1 Defined as a form of rule in which authority is imposed 'from above'.
2 Defined as a political association that exercises sovereign power in a certain territory and maintains social order through a set of public institutions.
3 Michael Mann (1993: 18-19) defines regime as 'an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state'.
4 Quezon served as president during the first seven years of the Commonwealth period , a transition to independence that was interrupted by the Japanese occupation in 1942-45. He died in exile in 1944.
5 For a more elaborate discussion of clientelistic parties, see Gunther and Diamond (2001: chapter 1) . 6 In the CPI ratings, scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). 
